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THAT SERPENTINE WALL OF SEPARATION 
John Witte, Jr.* 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE. By Daniel L. Dreisbach. New York and Lon­
don: New York University Press. 2002. Pp. x, 283. $42: 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. By Philip Hamburger. Cam­
bridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. xiii, 514. 
$49.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"The task of separating the secular from the religious in education 
is one of magnitude, intricacy, and delicacy," Justice Jackson wrote, 
concurring in McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court's 
first religion in public schools case. 1  "To lay down a sweeping constitu­
tional doctrine" of absolute separation of church and state "is to 
decree a uniform . . .  unchanging standard for countless school boards 
representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ 
from each other but which themselves from time to time change atti­
tudes. "2 If we persist in this experiment, Justice Jackson warned his 
brethren, "we are likely to make the legal 'wall of separation between 
church and state' as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by 
Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded."3 
While a majority of the United States Supreme Court embarked 
on a four-decade project of building this "serpentine wall,"4 Justice 
Jackson took little further part in the effort. He continued to regard 
the separation of church and state as essential to the protection of 
* Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Director of Law and Religion Program, Director 
of Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion, Emory University. B.A. 19 82, Calvin 
College; J.D. 19 85, Harvard. - Ed. My thanks to Harold Rerman, Russell Hittinger, Robert 
A. Schapiro, and Charles A. Shanor for their helpful comments on a draft of this Review. 
1. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (19 48) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 238; see also DREISBACH, p. 109 .  
4. DREISBACH, pp. 100-04 (summarizing cases); HAMBURGER, pp. 463-78. The most 
recent Supreme Court cases where the separationist principle dominated the Court's rea­
soning were Texas M ont hly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (19 89 ); Agui lar v. Felt on, 473 U.S. 402 
(19 85); and Larki n v. Grendel' s Den Inc., 459 U.S. 1 16 (19 82). 
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religious liberty, along with the freedoms of conscience,5 exercise, and 
speech.6 But he had no patience with unilateral or extreme applica­
tions of any of these First Amendment principles,7 not least the princi­
ple of separation of church and state. Imprudent application of this 
latter principle, he wrote, would draw the Court into "passionate 
dialectics" about "nonessential details" that were often better left to 
state and local governments to resolve.8 In his last years on the bench, 
Jackson thus led the Court in a case that denied standing to a party 
who argued that religious instruction in a public school violated the 
separation of church and state.9 He was the sole dissenter in a church 
property dispute case, where the Court read the principle of separa­
tion to require a state to defer to the internal religious law of the dis­
putants rather than apply its own state laws.10 He dissented again from 
the Court's decision to uphold a public school program that gave stu­
dents release time to participate in religious events off site. 1 1  Arguing 
that this was precisely the kind of case where the principle of separa­
tion did apply, he complained: "The wall which the Court was pro­
fessing to erect between Church and State has become even more 
warped and twisted than I expected. " 12 
For all his growing misgivings about separationism, however, even 
this bold dissenter on the Court,13 well trained in legal history,14 never 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-9 5 (19 44) (Jackson, J., dissenting 
from decision to use the truth of a professed religious belief to question a party's sincerity); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176- 78 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting from decision to 
uphold child-labor laws against distribution of religious literature by a minor); West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 642 (19 43) (Jackson, J., writing for the majority, ex­
empting Jehovah's Witnesses from compulsory flag salute). 
6. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 76-77 (19 55); Paul A. Freund, Mr. J usti ce J acks on and Indi vi dual Ri ghts , i n  
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTURES IN HIS HONOR 29 , 36- 43 (19 69 )  (summarizing 
cases). 
7. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 29 0, 29 5- 314 (19 51 )  (Jackson, J., dissenting from 
holding that a city may not deny a license to a Baptist preacher in a public park); Terme­
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13- 37 (19 49 )  (Jackson, J. ,  dissenting from holding that free 
speech protects anti-Semitic hate speech that causes riot); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 
566-72 (19 48) (Jackson, J., dissenting from holding that banning religious broadcasts without 
a license violates free speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117-34 (19 43) (Reed 
and Jackson, JJ., dissenting from holding that free-exercise rights prohibit laws requiring re­
ligious solicitors to procure a license in advance). 
8. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 32 5 (19 52 )  (Jackson, J., dissenting); s ee also 
JACKSON, s upra note 6, at 65- 83 (examining role of Supreme Court in state and local dis­
putes). 
9 .  Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (19 52 ). 
10. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 9 4, 12 6- 32 (19 52 )  (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). 
11 .  Z orach, 343 U.S. at 32 3-2 5  (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
12 . Id. at 32 5. 
13. See EUGENE c. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H.  JACKSON 29 4-300 
(19 58). Of Justice Jackson's 32 4 Supreme Court opinions, 109 were dissents, 63 concur-
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once questioned the historical foundation or constitutional imperative 
of strict separationism. In Everson v. Board of Education,15 the 
Supreme Court for the first time applied the First Amendment 
disestablishment guarantee to the states. Justice Black, Jackson's 
nemesis,16 wrote for the Everson majority. After a lengthy historical 
recitation, Black quoted Thomas Jefferson's famous 1802 Letter to the 
Danbury Baptist Association as dispositive evidence that the "First 
Amendment has erected a wall of separation between church and 
state" that "must be kept high and impregnable."17 Though Jackson 
dissented from the Everson holding, he accepted the Court's account 
of. the history and meaning of the First Amendment.18 Jackson was 
concerned about the rhetorical "undertones" of "advocating complete 
and uncompromising separation of Church from state." 1 9  He was not 
concerned about the historical underpinnings of separationism itself. 
Indeed, Jackson thought his views to be in full accord with the intent 
of the founders - not least his hero President Thomas Jefferson.20 
Justice Jackson might well have come to a different opinion had he 
enjoyed the luxury of reading the two exquisite books here under re­
view. He would have learned that the history of separationism was far 
more "serpentine" than the straightforward history lesson of Everson 
had led him to believe. And he would have learned that the wall-of­
separation metaphor was itself potentially "serpentine" - now in the 
sense of the ancient serpent in the garden of Eden who offered access 
to enduring wisdom by means of a seductively simple formula.21 
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched," Benjamin Cardozo 
had warned in 1926, "for starting as devices to liberate thought, they 
end often by enslaving it. "22 So it has been with the metaphor of a wall 
of separation.23 What started as one of several useful principles of 
rences. Id. at 504 n.95; Bi bli ography: T he J udi ci al Opi ni ons of J usti ce Robert H. J ackson i n  
t he Supreme Court of t he Unit ed St at es O ct ober 6, 1941 - O ct ober 9, I954, 8 STAN. L. REV. 
60, 60-71 (1955). 
14. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) (giv-
ing a detailed history of constitutional law). 
15 .  330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
16. Dennis J. Hutchinson, T he Black-J ackson Feud, 1988 SUP. er. REV. 203. 
17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
18. Id. at 28. 
19. Id. at 19. 
20. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 315 (discussing Jefferson). 
21. Genesi s 3:1-7. 
22. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
23. See DREISBACH, pp. 107-28, and HAMBURGER, pp. 487-90, on the virtues and vices 
of the wall metaphor. 
1872 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 1 01:1 869 
religious liberty eventually became a mechanical test24 that courts 
applied bluntly, even slavishly, in a whole series of cases. What started 
as one of many images25 of a budding new national law of religious 
liberty, became for many the mandate and measure of the First 
Amendment itself. 
While the United States Supreme Court has, of late, abandoned 
much of its earlier separationism,26 and overruled some of its harshest 
applications in earlier cases,27 the wall-of-separation metaphor has 
lived on in popular imagination as the salutary source and summary of 
American religious liberty (Hamburger, pp. 1-8; Dreisbach, pp. 1-8, 
107-28). Even popular imagination might change, if the findings of 
Professors Dreisbach and Hamburger are taken seriously.28 
II. ENTER HAMBURGER AND DREISBACH 
Between the two of them, Daniel Dreisbach29 and Philip Ham­
burger30 tell much of the American history of the (wall of) separation 
of church and state in its genesis, exodus, and deuteronomy - (1) its 
origins in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings; (2) its migra­
tion and manipulation in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
American lore and law; and (3) its second legal life (its "deutero­
nomos") in Everson and its immediate progeny. 
Philip Hamburger's Separation of Church and State is a riveting 
and recondite intellectual history of American separationism. The 
heart of the book analyzes developments from Thomas Jefferson's 
1802 Danbury Baptist Letter to . Justice Black's opinion in the 1947 
Everson case (Hamburger, pp. 111-492). While Hamburger inevitably 
covers some of the same ground broken earlier by Anson Stokes,31 
24 . Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4 03 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring that government policies chal­
lenged under the establishment clause must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) have a primary ef­
fect that neither advances or inhibits religion; and 3) not foster an excessive entanglement 
between church and state). 
25. For other images that were current, including "barriers," "fences," and "lines" of 
separation, see DREISBACH, pp. 83- 89. 
26. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 5 36 U.S. 639 (2002); Rosenberger v. Rectors of Univ. of 
Va., 5 15 U.S. 81 9 (1995 ); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 5 09 U.S. 1 (1993); Bd. of 
Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 4 96 U.S. 226 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 4 87 
U.S. 5 89 (1 988); cases cited infra note 27. 
27. Mitchell v. Helms, 5 30 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (overruling Wolman v. Walter, 4 33 U.S. 
229 (1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 4 21 U.S. 34 9 (1975 )); Agostini v. Felton, 5 21 U.S. 203, 235 
(1 997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 4 73 U.S. 4 02 (1985 )). 
28. But note the tenacity of the separationist lobby as reported in Daniel L. Dreisbach, 
Thom as J efferson an d the D an bury Bapti st s  Revi si ted, 5 6  WM. & MARY Q. 805 (1999). 
29. Professor, Department of Justice, Law, and Society, American University. 
30. John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
31. ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1 95 0). 
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Leo Pfeffer,32 Leonard Levy,33 and others,34 his book breaks much new 
ground and blows much thick dust from long-forgotten archives. 
Particularly novel and valuable is his treatment of separationism in the 
last two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and his detailed analysis of 
the shifting and sometimes overlapping views of separationism among 
American Protestants, Unitarians, the National Liberal League, the 
Ku Klux Klan, and sundry other groups (Hamburger, pp. 193-390). 
Hamburger's volume brings to light and life scores of long-obscure 
pamphlets, speeches, and sermons on separationism, many of which 
have been known only to denominational specialists and church histo­
rians. 
Hamburger's writing throughout is lean, learned, and lively. 
Convenient forecasts and summaries open and close each of the four 
major sections of the book - "Late Eighteenth-Century Religious 
Liberty," "Early Nineteenth-Century Republicanism," "Mid­
Nineteenth-Century Americanism," and "Late Nineteenth- and Early 
Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law." Crisp summaries again open 
and close most of the fourteen meaty chapters. A detailed index 
allows novices and experts alike to mine the book with profit. While I 
have ample reservations about parts of Professor Hamburger's analy­
sis,35 I believe his book will rightly become the standard intellectual 
history of nineteenth-century American separationism for years to 
come. 
While Hamburger pans with a binocular to paint his panorama, 
Dreisbach probes with an x-ray machine to interpret his texts. Quite 
literally. In 1998, James Hutson, chief archivist at the Library of 
Congress, had sent the original manuscript of Jefferson's 1802 Letter 
to the Danbury Baptists, with all of its scratch outs and penned over 
sections, to the FBI laboratory. Using x-rays and other techniques, the 
FBI uncovered the full original letter with all its stops and starts, 
thoughts and rethoughts spelled out.36 For Dreisbach, this is precisely 
the sort of evidence that is needed to understand what Thomas 
32. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967). 
33. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994). 
34. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A 
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997); THE WALL 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963). 
35. See infra notes 93-95, 1 17-118, 121-129 and accompanying text. 
36. James H. Hutson, "A W al l  of Separation ": FBI Helps Restore J eff erson 's O bl iterated 
D raft, 57 LIBR. CONG. BULL. 136-39, 163 (1998). The original Jefferson letter is reprinted in 
DREISBACH, pp. 144-46. It was the subject of a major conference, anthology, and literary 
forum that Hutson, Dreisbach, and others helped to organize. See RELIGION AND THE NEW 
REPUBLIC: FAITH AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (James H. Huston ed., 2000) (based on 
papers of a June 18-19, 1998 conference at the Library of Congress); Forum, 56 WM. & 
MARY Q. 775 (1999). 
1874 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 01:1869 
Jefferson intended by his reference to a "wall of separation between 
church and state." Dreisbach's analysis ripples out from this core 1802 
text - reaching back to colonial and earlier European formulations of 
separationism (Dreisbach, pp. 71-82), and forward to selected nine­
teenth- and twentieth-century interpretations, including those of the 
United States Supreme Court (Dreisbach, pp. 95-128). 
This book is vintage Dreisbach.37 A neatly trimmed and tightly 
written text of 128 pages is built on a scholarly foundation of even 
greater thickness: eighty-nine pages of dense notes, twenty-four 
pages of bibliography, and nine appendices with critical editions of 
Jefferson's letters to and about the Danbury Baptists as well as other 
key documents on religious liberty that Jefferson wrote as Virginia's 
Governor and as America's President and aged savant. Any-one 
studying Jefferson's views of separation would be wise to use Dreis­
bach's primary texts and to ponder his interpretation of them. Anyone 
studying the history of separation in America will find all manner of 
literary leads in Dreisbach's hefty bibliography and detailed notes 
(Dreisbach, pp. 155-269). This is a book that can be read in an even­
ing, but pondered for a career. 
These two books inevitably overlap somewhat in topics and texts 
covered, but they are by no means duplicative. While the two authors 
cite each other regularly and favorably,38 their interpretations differ 
markedly at critical points. 
First, Hamburger views Jefferson's 1802 letter as the first 
full statement of separationism in America, deeply informed by 
Jefferson's anticlericalism, religious individualism, Republican politics, 
and scientific positivism. Both the term and the concept of 
separationism, Hamburger argues, were notably absent from earlier 
American and European writings, and conspicuously absent from the 
debates over the First Amendment.39 By contrast, Dreisbach argues 
that Jefferson maintained a common Western view that religious and 
political authorities had to keep separate jurisdictions, a view that he 
repeated many times in formal and informal writings before and after 
1802. More important, Jefferson's 1802 letter simply repeated what the 
founders commonly understood the First Amendment to be: It was a 
declaration that the federal government ("Congress") had no jurisdic-
37. It is much in the style of RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER 
ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE (Daniel L. Dreisbach ed., 1996) and DANIEL L. 
DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 55-76 (1987). It also echoes and elaborates some of his earlier articles, cited in 
DREISBACH, pp. 250-51 . 
38. Dreisbach gave Hamburger's book a handsome jacket endorsement and cited him 
several times throughout. DREISBACH, pp. 7, 29, 52, 200, 203, 225. Hamburger sent Dreis­
bach his draft manuscript, DREISBACH, p. 272, and discussed his views generously. See 
HAMBURGER, pp. 1-2, 4, 55, 159, 164, 259. 
39. See infra notes 1 17-118 and accompanying text. 
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tion over questions of religion and religious liberty; these were left to 
the states to resolve in accordance with their own state constitutions.40 
Second, Hamburger argues that, in the course of the nineteenth 
century, strict separation of church and state became an American 
ideal. It was the product of a growing alliance among "nativist 
Protestants," theological liberals, anti-Christian secularists, and radical 
groups like the .Know Nothings and Ku Klux Klan. These groups 
adopted the principle of separation of church and state as a weapon 
first against Catholics, then against clerics and religious groups 
altogether. Because they feared religious organizations and authori­
ties, these groups argued that religious liberty was principally an indi­
vidual right that required a separation of church from state.41 By con­
trast, Dreisbach sees little evidence of any sustained strict separation 
of church and state in nineteenth-century law.42 Separationism did 
gather ample rhetorical currency among some groups but garnered lit­
tle legal change. The dominant reality of the nineteenth century was 
that church and state officials were formally separate but functionally 
cooperated in a variety of ways, particularly at the local level.43 
Third, Dreisbach condemns Everson 's separationism as an 
abruptly revisionist statement of constitutional law and a fundamental 
misreading of the history and original intent of the eighteenth-century 
founders, not least the views of Thomas Jefferson himself. For 
Dreisbach, it was ultimately Justice Black, not Thomas Jefferson, who 
raised strict separationism to a constitutional mandate.44 Hamburger 
almost shrugs off Everson and its progeny as the inevitable triumph of 
Jefferson's relentlessly separationist logic that had gradually gained 
adherence and adherents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu­
ries. For Hamburger, Everson merely codified and culminated 
common American sentiments, catalyzed more than a century before 
by Jefferson and anticipated in many popular movements and legal 
developments beforehand.45 
What follows is a few of the high points of the long story of the 
genesis, exodus, and deuteronomy of the principle of separation of 
church and state. I focus first on earlier materials not included in 
either volume. I then turn to a few topics and texts on which these two 
authors differ markedly in interpretation or where my own interpreta­
tion of the sources differs from one or both of theirs. 
40. See i nfra note 116 and accompanying text. 
41. See i nfra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
42. See i nfra notes 149-152 and accompanying text. 
43. See i nfra notes 139-147 and accompanying text. 
44. See i nfra note 155 and accompanying text. 
45. See i nfra notes 105-106, 155 and accompanying text. 
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III. GENESIS: THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN SEPARATIONISM 
A. Biblical Roots 
Though it makes only modest appearance in these two volumes, 
(Hamburger, pp. 22, 29, 41, 44, 48; Dreisbach, p. 230 n.4), the Bible 
was the starting point for a good deal of Western speculation on the 
(wall of) separation of church and state. In the Hebrew Bible, the 
chosen people of ancient Israel were repeatedly enjoined to remain 
separate from the Gentile world around them46 and to separate the 
Levites and other temple officials from the rest of the people.47 The 
Hebrew Bible also made much of building and rebuilding "fortified 
walls"48 to protect the city of Jerusalem from the outside world and to 
separate the temple and its priests from the commons and its people49 
- an ancient tradition still recognized and symbolized in the Jewish 
rituals and prayers that take place at the Western (Wailing) Wall. 
The New Testament commanded believers to "render to Caesar 
the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's,"50 
and reminded them that "two swords" were enough to govern the 
world.51 Christians were warned that they should "be not conformed to 
this world"52 but remain "separate" from the world and its tempta­
tions,53 maintaining themselves in purity and piety. Echoing the He­
brew Bible, St. Paul spoke of a "wall of separation" (paries maceriae) 
between Christians and non-Christians interposed by the Law.54 Inter­
spersed among these various political dualisms, the Bible included 
many other dualisms - between spirit and flesh, soul and body, faith 
and works, heaven and hell, grace and nature, the kingdom of God 
and the kingdom of Satan, and much more.55 
46. 1 Esdras 7 -9; Exodus 34:1 1-16; Ezra 6:21 , 10: 1 ;  1 Kings 8:53; Leviticus 20: 24-5; Ne­
hemiah 9:1-15, 10:28-31 ,  1 3: 1-3; 2 Samuel 22: 26-7 . 
47 . 1 Chronicles 23: 13; Deuteronomy 1 0: 8, 32:8; Ezekial 40-42; Leviticus 21:1-22: 16; 
Numbers 8:14, 16:9. 
48. Jeremiah 1 :1 8, 15 :20. 
49. Ezekial 42:1 ; Jeremiah 1: 18-19, 1 5: 19-21; 1Kings 3:1; Nehemiah 3:1-32, 4: 15-20, 12:27 -
43. 
50. Mark 12:17 ; Matthew 22: 21 ;  Luke 20: 25. 
51 . Luke 22:38. 
52. Romans 12:2. 
53. 2 Corinthians 6:1 4-1 8. 
54. Ephesians 2:14. See historical interpretation of this text in MARKUS BARTH, THE 
ANCHOR BIBLE: EPHESIANS 263-65, 283-87 (1 97 4) . 
55. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS 
OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 82-1 9, 193-211 (1996) . 
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B. Early Catholic Models 
1 .  Two Communities 
These various biblical dualisms were repeated in some of the early 
church constitutions. Among the earliest was the Didache (ca. 120 
c.e.), which opened with a call for believers to separate from the world 
around them: "There are two Ways, one of Life and one of Death; but 
there is a great separation between the two Ways."56 The Way of Life 
follows the commandments of law and love. The Way of Death 
succumbs to sins and temptations. The two ways must remain utterly 
separate, and those who stray from the Way of Life must be cast out. 
The Epistle of Barnabas (ca. 100-120 c.e.) provided similarly: 
There are two ways of teaching and of authority, one of light and one of 
darkness. And there is a great difference between the two ways. For over 
one are set light-bearing angels of God, but over the other angels of Sa­
tan. And the one is Lord from eternity to eternity, but the other is prince 
of the present time of darkness. 57 
These dualistic adages and images recurred in scores of later 
apostolic and patristic writings of the second through fifth centuries -
both in the East and in the West.58 They became the basis for one per­
sistent model of separationism in the Christian West - the separation 
of the pure Christian life and community governed by religious 
authorities from the sinful and sometimes hostile world governed by 
political authorities. This apostolic ideal of separationism found its 
strongest and most enduring institutional form in monasticism, which 
produced a vast archipelago of communities of spiritual brothers and 
sisters, each walled off from the world around them.59 But separation­
ism in this sense also remained a recurrent spiritual ideal in Christian 
theology and homiletics - a perennial call to Christians to keep the 
Way of Life in the community of Christ separate from the Way of 
Death in the company of the Devil. 
56. Reprinted in PHILIP SCHAFF, THE TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES 1 62 -63 
(1889) (my translation). Several comparable formulae from the apostolic sources are quoted 
in id. at 163 n. 1 .  See comparable language in Deuteronomy 30: 15; Jeremiah 2 1: 8: Matthew 
7:13-14; and 2 Peter 2 :2 .  
57. Reprinted in SCHAFF, supra note 56, at 22 7-2 8. 
58. Id. at 18; GERARD E. CASPARY, POLITICS AND EXEGESIS: ORIGEN AND THE Two 
SWORDS (1979); LESTER L. FIELD, JR., LIBERTY, DOMINION, AND THE Two SWORDS: ON 
THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 180 -398 (1998); ADOLF HARNACK, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LA w OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST Two CENTURIES (F.L. Pogson 
trans., H.D.A. Major ed., 1910 ) . 
59. GERD TELLENBACH, CHURCH, STATE AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 2 5-2 9 (R.F. 
Bennett trans., 1959). See sources and discussion in MARILYN DUNN, THE EMERGENCE OF 
MONASTICISM: FROM THE DESERT FATHERS TO THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (2000 ); DAVID 
KNOWLES, CHRISTIAN MONASTICISM (1969); and C.H. LAWRENCE, MEDIEVAL 
MONASTICISM: FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (3d 
ed. 200 1).  
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2. Two Cities 
By the fifth century, Western Christianity had distilled these early 
biblical teachings into other models of separationism. The most 
famous was the image of two cities within one world, developed by St. 
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. In his City of God (c. 413-427),60 
Augustine contrasted the city of God with the city of man. The city of 
God consisted of all those who were predestined to salvation, bound 
by the love of God, and devoted to a life of Christian piety, morality, 
and worship led by the Christian clergy. The city of man consisted of 
all the things of this sinful world, and the political and social institu­
tions that God had created to maintain a modicum of order and 
peace.61 Augustine sometimes depicted this dualism as two walled 
cities separated from each other62 - particularly when he was 
describing the sequestered life and discipline of monasticism or the 
earlier plight of the Christian churches under Roman persecution.63 
But Augustine's more dominant teaching was that dual citizenship in 
both cities would be the norm until these two cities were fully and 
finally separated at the Last Judgment of God.64 For Augustine, it was 
ultimately impossible to achieve complete separation of the city of 
God and the city of man in this world. A Christian remained bound by 
the sinful habits of the world, even if he aspired to greater purity of 
the Gospel. A Christian remained subject to the authority of both 
cities, even if she aspired to be a citizen of the city of God alone. 
3. Two Powers 
It was crucial, however, that the spiritual and temporal powers that 
prevailed in these two cities remain separate in function. Even though 
Christianity became the one established religion of the Roman 
Empire, patronized and protected by the Roman state authorities, 
Augustine and other Church Fathers insisted that state power remain 
separate from church power. All magistrates, even the Roman emper­
ors, were not ordained clergy but laity. They had no power to adminis-
60. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF Goo 84-89, 460-73, 483-506 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans., 
Vernon J. Bourke ed., 1958) [hereinafter CITY OF Goo]. 
61. Id. at 494-506. 
62. Id. at 466-72; see also THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 241-75, 305-17 
(Henry Paolucci ed., 1962) (letters arguing that the authority of church and state are sepa­
rate but subject to the same power of God who enjoins Christian morality on both). 
63. See examples in JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF 
POLITICS (1995); J. VAN OORT, JERUSALEM AND BABYLON: A STUDY INTO AUGUSTINE'S 
CITY OF Goo AND THE SOURCES OF HIS DOCTRINE OF THE Two CITIES (1990); and 
EUGENE TESELLE, LIVING IN Two CITIES: AUGUSTINIAN TRAJECTORIES IN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (1998). 
64. CITY OF Goo, supra note 60, at 481-93. 
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ter the sacraments or to mete out religious discipline. They were 
bound by the teachings of the Bible, the decrees of the ecumenical 
councils, and the. traditions of their predecessors. They also had to 
accept the church's instruction, judgment, and spiritual discipline. 
Pope Gelasius put the matter famously in 494 in a letter rebuking 
Emperor Anastasius: 
There are indeed, most august Emperor, two powers by which this world 
is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the Popes and the royal power. Of 
these the priestly power is much more important, because it has to ren­
der account for the kings of men themselves at [the Last Judgment]. For 
you know, our very clement son, that although you have the chief place 
in dignity over the human race, yet you must submit yourself faithfully to 
those who have charge of Divine things, and look to them for the means 
of your salvation. 65 
This "two powers" passage became a locus classicus for many later 
theories of a basic separation between pope and emperor, clergy and 
laity, regnum and sacerdotium.66 
4. Two Swords 
In the course of the Papal Revolution67 of the eleventh to thir­
teenth centuries, this model of two separate powers within the 
extended Christian empire was transformed into a model of two 
swords ruling a unified Christendom.68 In the name of "freedom of the 
church" (libertas ecclesiae), Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) and his 
successors threw off their political patrons and protectors and estab­
lished the Catholic Church itself as the superior legal and political 
·authority of Western Christendom. The church now claimed more 
than a spiritual and sacramental power over its own affairs, a spiritual 
office within the Christian empire. It claimed a vast new jurisdiction, a 
political authority to make and enforce laws for all of Christendom. 
The pope and the clergy claimed exclusive personal jurisdiction 
over clerics, pilgrims, students, heretics, Jews, and Muslims. They 
claimed subject matter jurisdiction over doctrine, liturgy, patronage, 
education, charity, inheritance, marriage, oaths, oral promises, and 
moral crimes. And they claime<:l concurrent jurisdiction with state 
65. Quoted i n  CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION OF 
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 10-11 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall 
trans. & eds., 1954) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE]. 
66. See, e.g., ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN 
MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957); KARL FREDERICK MORRISON, THE Two 
KINGDOMS: ECCLESIOLOGY IN CAROLINGIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1964). 
67. The tem1 was made popular by HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). 
68. For the transmutation of the two-powers image to two swords, see BRIAN TIERNEY, 
THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300, at 53 (1964). 
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authorities over secular subjects that required the Church's special 
forms of Christian equity.69 A vast body of new church law, called 
canon law, issued by popes, bishops, and church councils came to gov­
ern Western Christendom. A vast network of church courts, headquar­
tered in the papal court, enforced these laws throughout the West.70 In 
the period from ca. 1 150-1350, the Roman Catholic Church ironically 
became "the first modern state" in the West.71 The Church's canon law 
became the first system of modern international law. 
This late medieval system of church government and law was 
grounded in part in the two-swords theory. This theory taught that the 
pope is the vicar of Christ, in whom Christ has vested his whole 
authority.72 This authority was symbolized in the "two swords" 
discussed in the Bible (Luke 22:38), a spiritual sword and a temporal 
sword. Christ had metaphorically handed these two swords to the 
highest being in the human world - the pope, the vicar of Christ. The 
pope and lower clergy wielded the spiritual sword, in part by estab­
lishing canon law rules for the governance of all Christendom. The 
clergy, however, generally delegated the temporal sword to those 
authorities below the spiritual realm - emperors, kings, dukes, and 
their civil retinues, who held their swords "of" and "for" the church. 
These civil magistrates were to promulgate and enforce civil laws in a 
manner consistent with canon law. Under this two-swords theory, civil 
law was by its nature preempted by canon law. Civil jurisdiction was 
subordinate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The state answered to the 
church.73 Pope Boniface VIII put this two-swords theory famously and 
forcefully in 1302: 
We are taught by the words of the Gospel that in this Church and in its 
power there are two swords, a spiritual, to wit, and a temporal. . . .  [B]oth 
are in the power of the Church, namely the spiritual and [temporal] 
swords; the one, indeed, to be wielded for the Church, the other by the 
Church; the former by the priest, the latter by the hand of kings and 
knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest. For it is necessary 
that one sword should be under another and that the temporal authority 
69. See BERMAN, supra note 67, at 85-119, 1 65-200; Udo Wolter, Amt und Officium in 
mittelalterlichen Quellen vom 13. bis 15. Jahrhundert, 105 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY­
STIFTUNG (KAN. AB.) 246 (1 988). 
70. B ERMAN, suprq note 67, at 199-254; R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL 
CANON LAW ( 1996). 
71. The phrase is from F.W. Maitland, quoted and elaborated in BERMAN, supra note 
67, at 1 13-15. 
72. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY, 1150-1350, at 39-45, 82-
121 (1972). 
73. On various medieval formulations, see OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF 
THE MIDDLE AGE 7-21 (Frederic William Maitland trans., .1958); 2 EWART LEWIS, 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 506-38 (1954). For patristic antecedents, see CASPARY, supra 
note 58, and FIELD, supra note 58. 
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should be subjected to the spiritual. . . .  If, therefore, the earthly power 
err, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual power 
err, it shall be judged by the higher, competent spiritual power; but if the 
supreme spiritual power [i.e. ,  the pope] err, it could be judged solely by 
God, not by man. 74 
Two communities, two cities, two powers, two swords: These were 
four models of separationism tha.t obtained in. the Western Catholic 
tradition in the first 1500 years. Each model emphasized different bib­
lical texts. Each started with a different theory of the church. But each 
was designed ultimately to separate the church from the state. On one 
extreme, the apostolic model of two communities was a separationism 
of survival - a means to protect the church from a hostile state and 
pagan world. On the other. extreme, the late medieval model of two 
swords was a separation of preemption - a means to protect the 
church in its superior legal rule within a unified world of Christendom. 
C. Early Protestant Models 
The sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation began as a call for 
freedom from the late medieval "two swords" regime - freedom of 
the church from the tyranny of the pope, freedom of the individual 
conscience from canon law and clerical control, freedom of state offi­
cials from church power and privilege. "Freedom of the Christian" was 
the rallying cry of the early Reformation.75 Catalyzed by Martin 
Luther's posting of the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517 and his burning of 
the canon law books in 1520, early Protestants denounced church laws 
and authorities in violent and vitriolic terms, and urged radical 
reforms of church and state on the strength of t°he Bible.76 
After a generation of experimentation, however, the four branches 
of the Protestant Reformation returned to variations of the same four 
models of separationism that the earlier Catholic tradition had forged 
- two communities, two cities, two powers, two swords - adding new 
accents and applications. 
1. Two Communities 
The Anabaptist tradition - Amish, Hutterites, Mennonites, Swiss 
Brethren, German Brethren, and others - returned to a variation of 
the apostolic model of two communities. Most Anabaptist communi-
74. Quoted in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 65, at 91-92. For other such later medie­
val formulations, see TIERNEY, supra note 68, at 180. 
75. MARTIN LUTHER, FREEDOM OF A CHRISTIAN (1520), reprinted in 31 LUTHER'S 
WORKS 327-77 (W. A. Lambert trans., J. Pelikan ed., 1968). 
76. See sources and discussion in JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE 
LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION 33-64 (2002) [hereinafter WITTE, 
LAW AND PROTESTANTISM] . 
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ties separated themselves into small, self-sufficient, intensely demo­
cratic communities, cordoned off from the world by what they called a 
"wall of separation."77 These separated communities governed them­
selves by biblical principles of discipleship, simplicity, charity, and 
nonresistance. They set their own internal standards of worship, 
liturgy, diet, discipline, dress, and education. They handled their own 
internal affairs of property, contracts, commerce, marriage, and inheri­
tance, without appeal to the state or to secular law.78 
The state, most Anabaptists believed, was part of the fallen world, 
and was to be avoided so far as possible. Though once the perfect 
creation of God, the world was now a sinful regime "beyond the 
perfection of Christ"79 and beyond the daily concern of the Christian 
believer. God had allowed the world to survive by appointing magis­
trates who used the coercion of the sword to maintain a modicum of 
order and peace. Christians should thus obey the state, so far as Scrip­
ture enjoined, such as in paying their taxes or registering their proper­
ties. But Christians were to avoid active participation in and interac­
tion with the state and the world. Most early-modern Anabaptists 
were pacifists, preferring derision, exile, or martyrdom to active 
participation in war. Most Anabaptists also refused to swear oaths, or 
to participate in political elections, civil litigation, or civic feasts and 
functions.80 
This early Anabaptist separationism was echoed in the seventeenth 
century by Rhode Island founder Roger Williams, who called for a 
"hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and 
the Wilderness of the world."81 It was elaborated by American Baptist 
and other Evangelical groups born of the Great Awakening ( c. 1720-
1780). These latter American groups were principally concerned to 
protect their churches from state interference. They strove for free­
dom from state control of their assembly and worship, state regula-
77. The phrase is from Menno Simons, quoted by DREISBACH, p. 73. See comparable 
sentiments in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF MENNO SIMONS, c. 1496-1561, at 29, 1 17-20, 
1 58-59, 190-206 (L. Verduin trans., J.C. Wenger ed., 1984). See also the call for "separation" 
in the Schleitheim Confession (1527), art. 4, in HOWARD J. LOEWEN, ONE LORD, ONE 
CHURCH, ONE HOPE, AND ONE Goo: MENNONITE CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN NORTH 
AMERICA 79-84 ( 1985). For the Biblical roots of this Anabaptist separationism, see 
BIBLICAL CONCORDANCE OF THE SWISS BRETHREN, 1540, at 56-60 (Gilbert Fast & Galen 
A. Peters trans., C. Arnold Synder ed., 2001) (a frequently reprinted volume listing all the 
biblical passages on separation that were to be the subject of Anabaptist sermons, devotions, 
and catechesis ). 
78. See illustrative texts in ANABAPTISM IN OUTLINE 101- 14, 211-32 (Walter Klaasen 
ed., 1981). 
79. This language is from the Schleitheim Confession (1527), art. 6, supra note 77, at 80-
81. 
80. See samples in ANA BAPTISM IN OUTLINE, supra note 78, at 244-63. 
81 . Letter from Roger Williams to John Cotton (1643), in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS 
OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963). 
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tions of their property and polity, state incorporation of their society 
and clergy, state interference in their discipline and government, and 
state collection of religious tithes and taxes. Some American Baptist 
groups went further to argue against tax exemptions, civil immunities, 
and property donations as well. Religious bodies that received state 
benefits, they feared, would become too beholden to the state and too 
dependent on its patronage for survival.82 
2. Two Kingdoms 
The Lutheran tradition returned to a variation on Augustine's two­
cities theory. The fullest formulation came in Martin Luther's complex 
two-kingdoms theory, which provided what Luther called a "paper 
wall" between the spiritual and temporal estates.83 God has ordained 
two kingdoms or realms in which humanity is destined to live, Luther 
argued, the earthly kingdom and the heavenly kingdom. The earthly 
kingdom is the realm of creation, of natural and civic life, where a 
person operates primarily by reason and law. The heavenly kingdom is 
the realm of redemption, of spiritual and eternal life, where a person 
operates primarily by faith and love. These two kingdoms embrace 
parallel forms of righteousness and justice, government and order, 
truth and knowledge. They interact and depend upon each other in a 
variety of ways. But these two kingdoms ultimately remain distinct. 
The earthly kingdom is distorted by sin and governed by the Law. The 
heavenly kingdom is renewed by grace and guided by the Gospel. A 
Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms at once and invariably comes 
under the distinctive government of each. As a heavenly citizen, the 
Christian remains free in his or her conscience, called to live fully by 
the light of the Word of God. But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is 
bound by law, and called to obey the natural orders and offices of 
household, state, and visible church that God has ordained and main­
tained for the governance of this earthly kingdom. 
In Luther's view, the church was not a political or legal authority. 
The church has no sword, no jurisdiction, no daily responsibility for 
law. The church and its leadership were to separate itself from legal 
affairs and attend to the principal callings of preaching the word, 
administering the sacraments, catechizing the young, and helping the 
needy. While the church should cooperate in implementing laws, and 
82. See sources in WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833: 
THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971); WILLIAM G. 
MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS' STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630-1833 
(1991); and ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 
(William G. McLaughlin ed., 1968). 
83. Detailed sources for this subsection are in WITTE, LA w AND PROTESTANTISM, supra 
note 76, at 87-117. 
1884 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101: 1869 
its clergy and professors were to preach against injustice, formal legal 
authority lay with the state. 
The local magistrate was God's vice-regent called to elaborate 
natural law and to reflect divine justice in his local domain. The local 
magistrate was also the "father of the community" (Landesvater). Like 
a loving father, he was to keep the peace and to protect his subjects in 
their persons, properties, and reputations. He was to deter his subjects 
from abusing themselves through drunkenness, sumptuousness, 
gambling, prostitution, and other vices. He was to nurture his subjects 
through the community chest, the public almshouse, and the state-run 
hospice. He was to educate them through the public school, the public 
library, and the public lectern. He was to see to their spiritual needs by 
supporting the ministry of the local church, and encouraging atten­
dance and participation through civil laws of religious worship and 
tithing.84 
3. Two Powers 
The Calvinist Reformation returned to a vanat1on on the two­
powers model, in which both church and state exercised separate but 
coordinate powers within a unitary local Christian commonwealth.85 
Calvinists insist�d on the basic separation of the offices and operations 
of church and state. Adverting frequently to St. Paul's image of a "wall 
of separation," John Calvin insisted that the "political kingdom" and 
"spiritual kingdom" must always be "examined separately." For there 
is "a great difference . . .  between ecclesiastical and civil power," and it 
would be unwise to "mingle these two, which have a completely dif­
ferent nature."86 But Calvin and his followers insisted that the church 
play a role in governing the local Christian commonwealth. In Calvin's 
Geneva, this role fell largely to the consistory, an elected body of civil 
and religious officials, with original jurisdiction over cases of marriage 
and family, charity and social welfare, worship and public morality. 
Among most later Calvinists - French Huguenots, Dutch Pietists, 
Scottish Presbyterians, German Reformed, and English Puritans -
the Genevan-style consistory was transformed into the body of 
pastors, elders, deacons, and teachers that governed each local church 
congregation without state interference and cooperated with state of­
ficials in defining and enforcing public morals.87 
84. See sources and discussion in i d. at 108-15, 129-40, 147-64. 
85. Detailed sources for this subsection are in John Witte, Jr., Moderate Religious Lib­
erty in the Theology of John Calvin, 31 CALVIN THEOLOGICAL J. 359, 392 (1996). 
86. See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 847, 1215, 1486 
(F .L . Battles trans., John T. McNeill ed., 1960) (1559); see also 39 IOANNIS CALVIN!, OPERA 
QUAE SUPERSUNT OMNIA 352 (G. Baum et al. eds., 1863); 48 CALVIN!, supra, at 277. 
87. See representative articles in CALVIN'S THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
ISSUES AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE (Richard c. Gamble ed., 1992) 
May 2003] The Serpentine Wall 1885 
These early Calvinist views on separationism came to prominent 
expression in the New England colonies and states.88 New England 
Calvinists - variously called Puritans, Pilgrims, Congregationalists, 
Independents, Brownists, and Separatists - generally conceived of 
the church and the state as two separate covenantal associations, two 
seats of Godly authority in the community, each with a distinct polity 
and calling. The church was to be governed by pastoral, pedagogical, 
and diaconal authorities who were called to preach the word, adminis­
ter the sacraments, teach the young, and care for the poor and the 
needy. The state was to be governed by executive, legislative, and 
judicial authorities who were called to enforce law, punish crime, cul­
tivate virtue, and protect peace and order. 
Church and state officials were to remain separate. Church officials 
were prohibited from holding political office, serving on juries, inter­
fering in governmental affairs, endorsing political candidates, or cen­
suring the official conduct of a statesman. Political officials, in turn, 
were prohibited from holding ministerial office, interfering in internal 
ecclesiastical government, performing sacerdotal functions of clergy, 
or censuring the official conduct of a cleric. But church and state offi­
cials could and should make common cause in serving the common 
good of the community as a whole - cooperating in the maintenance 
of public religion, morality, education, charity, and other good works. 
4. Two Swords 
The Anglican tradition returned to a variation on the two-swords 
theory, but now with the English Crown, not the pope, holding the 
superior sword within the unitary Christian commonwealth of 
England. In a series of Acts passed in the 1530s, King Henry VIII 
severed all legal and political ties between the Church in England and 
the pope.89 The Supremacy Act of 1534 declared the English monarch 
to be "the only supreme head" of the Church and Commonwealth of 
England, with final spiritual and temporal authority.90 The English 
monarchs and Parliaments thus established a uniform doctrine, liturgy, 
and canon by issuing the Book of Common Prayer, the Thirty-Nine 
and the classic study of JOSEF BOHATEC, CALVINS LEHRE VON STAAT UND KIRCHE MIT 
BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DES 0RGANISMUSGEDANKENS (1968). 
88. EMIL OBERHOLZER, JR., DELINQUENT SAINTS: DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN THE 
EARLY CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES IN MASSACHUSETTS (1956); DAVID A. WEIR, 
COVENANT AND COVENANTING IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (forthcoming 
2004). See key documents in WILLISTON WALKER, THE CREEDS AND PLATFORMS OF 
CONGREGATIONALISM (1991). 
89. See sources in SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 304-12 (Carl F. 
Stephenson & Frederick G. Marcham eds. & trans., 1937). 
90. Reprinted in id. at 311. For further discussion of The Supremacy Act of 1534, see 2 
JOSEF LECLER, TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION 329-79 (1960). 
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Articles, and the Authorized (King James) Version of the Bible. They 
also assumed final legal responsibility for poor relief, marriage, educa­
tion, and other activities, delegating some of this responsibility back to 
Convocation, the church courts, or parish clergy. Clergy were 
appointed, supervised, and removed by the Crown and its delegates. 
Communicant status in the Church of England was rendered a condi­
tion for citizenship status in the Commonwealth of England. Contra­
ventions of royal religious policy were punishable both as heresy and 
as treason. A whole battery of apologists rose to the defense of this 
alliance of Church, Commonwealth, and Crown, notably Thomas 
Cranmer, Richard Hooker, and Robert Filmer. 
Richard Hooker's lengthy apologia for the Anglican establishment 
was particularly significant, for he offered a sustained rebuke to 
English separationists. In the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
various non-Anglican Protestant groups in England - Puritans, 
Brownists, Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, and other self-styled 
"Separatists"91 - had called the English church and state to a greater 
separation from each other and from the Church of Rome. They also 
had called their own faithful to a greater separation from the Church 
and Commonwealth of England. Richard Hooker had no patience 
with any of this. In his massive Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593-
1600), Hooker recognized a "natural separation" between the Church 
and the Commonwealth of England. But he insisted that these 
two bodies had to be "under one chief Governor."92 For Hooker, 
Separatists who sought to erect "a wall of separation" between Church 
and Commonwealth would destroy English unity and deprive its 
church of the natural and necessary patronage and protection of the 
Crown. It was a short step from this argument to the bitter campaigns 
of persecution in the early seventeenth century that drove many thou­
sands of Separatists from England to Holland and to North America. 
91 . On various English and New England "separatists" see NORMAN ALLEN BAXTER, 
HISTORY OF THE FREEWILL BAPTISTS: A STUDY IN NEW ENGLAND SEPARATISM (1957); 
EDWARD H.  BLOOMFIELD, THE OPPOSITION TO THE ENGLISH SEPARATISTS, 1570-1625 
(1981) ;  STEPHEN BRACHLOW, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS: RADICAL PURITAN AND 
SEPARATIST ECCLESIOLOGY 1570-1625 (1988); CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, THE EARLY 
ENGLISH DISSENTERS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT RESEARCH (1550-1641) (1912); JAMES 
ROBERT COGGINS, JOHN SMYTH'S CONGREGATION: ENGLISH SEPARATISM, MENNONITE 
INFLUENCE, AND THE ELECT NATION 29-68, 128-32 (1991); TIMOTHY GEORGE, JOHN 
ROBINSON AND THE ENGLISH SEPARATIST TRADITION (1982); C.C. GOEN, REVIVALISM 
AND SEPARATISM IN NEW ENGLAND, 1740-1800 (1962); B .R. WHITE, THE ENGLISH 
SEPARATIST TRADITION: FROM THE MARIAN MARTYRS TO THE PILGRIM FATHERS (1971); 
and Verne Dale Morey, The Brownist Churches: A Study in English Separatism, 1553-1630 
(1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). 
92. RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 129-38 (Arthur 
Stephen McGrade ed., 1989); see DREISBACH, pp. 73-76; HAMBURGER, pp. 32-38. 
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D. Significance of This Earlier History 
Professors Dreisbach and Hamburger pick up the story from here, 
each pausing to inspect the views of Richard Hooker and Roger 
Williams (Dreisbach, pp. 73-79; Hamburger, pp. 32-45, 50-53) before 
plunging into more familiar texts by James Burgh, Thomas Paine, 
Isaac Backus, Jam es Madison, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
and many others. Dreisbach recognizes full well "that the 'wall of 
separation' metaphor has a long history in Western theological and 
political discourse" before the eighteenth century (Dreisbach, p. 104), 
topics on which he has written astutely before.93 In this book, 
Dreisbach focuses deliberately on American examples. 
Hamburger, however, argues that "in the centuries prior to 1800 
the idea of the separation of church and state appealed to only a tiny 
fraction of Europeans and Americans" (Hamburger, p. 21). The 
occasional references to separation that do exist before Jefferson's 
1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, he argues, were at best only 
"nascent manifestations" of the ideal of separation of church and state 
(Hamburger, p. 29) . "Earlier Christians . . .  adopted many different 
conceptions of the relationship between church and state, but they did 
not ordinarily, if ever, propose a separation, let alone a wall of separa­
tion, between these two institutions" (Hamburger, p. 29). Seven­
teenth- and early eighteenth-century writers in America, England, and 
France generally said "little if anything about" separation 
(Hamburger, p. 78), and none "even came close to" advocating sepa­
ration of church and state (Hamburger, p. 79). Even the more radical 
writers of the day, from John Locke and Roger Williams to Marquis 
de Condorcet and Thomas Paine, had formulations of separations that 
were "very limited" in scope (Hamburger, pp. 53, 60, 89), and at best 
"sort of," "not quite," "close to," "almost espoused" formulations of a 
separation of church and state (Hamburger, pp. 53, 57, 60, 65, 79, 89). 
And even these prototypical views "made little impression" 
(Hamburger, p. 60) and "found little support" (Hamburger, p. 53). 
In fact, there was a great deal of support for separation of church 
and state in earlier American and European traditions, little of which 
makes its way into Professor Hamburger's volume. As the foregoing 
thumbnail sketch illustrates, Catholics and Protestants alike had 
robust, diverse, and evolving theories of separation of church and 
state, many grounded in the Bible and classical texts. The archives 
hold a massive farrago of unexplored sermons and commentaries on 
the many biblical passages that call for (walls of) separation between 
the faithful and fallen, the religious and the political, the priests and 
the people, the church and the state. The archives also hold a whole 
arsenal of legal and political provisions that churchmen and statesmen 
93. See comments in DREISBACH, pp. 72-73, and sources in DREISBACH, pp. 250-51 . 
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forged over the centuries to delimit their respective offices and powers 
and to determine their mutual responsibilities and rights. 
Much of this rich history is lost in Hamburger's early chapters that 
repeatedly juxtapose the views of "religious establishments" and 
"religious dissenters." Religious establishmentarians, in his view, were 
by definition not separationist. Religious dissenters were not separa­
tionist either, he argues, but were "falsely accused" of being so by the 
religious establishment (Hamburger, pp. 65-80). 
The binocular of establishment versus dissenter, however, does not 
bring the many varieties of separationism into proper focus. Religious 
establishmentarians and religious dissenters alike taught different 
forms of separationism, and these often clashed. Thus, for example, in 
seventeenth-century England, Calvinists who sought a different sepa­
ration of church and state than prevailed in the Anglican establish­
ment were called dissenters. In seventeenth-century New England, 
however, Calvinists were the religious establishment and the 
Anglicans in their midst were the dissenters. Yet the seventeenth­
century Calvinist doctrines of separation of church and state were 
virtually identical on both sides of the Atlantic.94 Similarly, eighteenth­
century Presbyterians in Scotland were part of the religious establish­
ment, but when they moved to America, they were usually treated as 
religious dissenters, even in Puritan New England. And while Profes­
sor Hamburger lumps these Presbyterians in with other American 
dissenters (Hamburger, pp. 92-94, 102-04), American Presbyterians 
not only divided bitterly on issues of separationism,95 but their views 
differed markedly from those taught by other so-called "religious 
dissenters" in America - Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, Lutherans, 
Moravians, Mennonites, ,Reformed, and others.96 
Professor Hamburger too readily equates the separation of church 
and state with the disestablishment of religion in judging the 
pre-nineteenth-century material.97 He thus too easily dismisses the 
94. See, e.g., EDMUND s. MORGAN, PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS: 1558-1794 (1965); John 
Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contributions to American 
Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 41  (1990). 
95. For an example, see the debates over reformulation of the provisions on church and 
state in the Westminster Confession (1647), in 1 PHILLIP SCHAFF, CREEDS OF 
CHRISTENDOM WITH A HISTORY AND CRITICAL NOTES 807-08 (4th ed. 1877) [hereinafter 
CREEDS); 3 SCHAFF, supra, at 653-54; WALKER, supra note 88, at 388-97. 
96. See detailed religious demography in EDWIN SCOTT GAUSTAD & PHILIP L. 
BARLOW, NEW HISTORICAL ATLAS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (2001). 
97. See, e.g. , HAMBURGER, pp. 23, 36-38, 53-54, 58, 79-83 (arguing repeatedly that cer­
tain texts were not really separationist because their authors still countenanced an estab­
lished religion). This stands in contrast to a central method and thesis of the rest of his vol­
ume: "Underlying the story recorded here is the distinction between the separation of 
church and state and the constitutional freedom from a religious establishment. For many 
Americans, the differences between these ideals has become difficult to discern." See exam­
ples in HAMBURGER, pp. 6-9. "The difference, however, was of profound importance to ear­
lier Americans." HAMBURGER, pp. 479-80. 
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varieties of separation that were taught by religious establishmentari­
ans - even when they expressly called for (a wall of) separation 
between church and state. And he too easily passes over many ser­
mons and theological writings of "religious dissenters" that were not 
directed to advocating the disestablishment of religion - even though 
they, too, sometimes sounded in separationist terms. 
Moreover, after learning that the pre-nineteenth-century refer­
ences to separationism that Hamburger does discuss were all only 
"partial," "incomplete," "nascent," "close to," but "not quite" separa­
tionist, a reader could rightly expect a very clear and detailed defini­
tion of separation of church and state against which these writings are 
being measured. But no such definition appears. Professor Hamburger 
properly warns the reader (Hamburger, pp . .  8-14) that eighteenth­
century definitions of separationism should not be equated with the 
twentieth-century separationism of the Supreme Court. I agree 
completely. But what then is the eighteenth-century definition of 
separation of church and state against which earlier theories are being 
judged? The book does not say. 
IV. EXODUS: THE ROUTES OF AMERICAN SEPARATIONISM 
A. Five Varieties of Separationism 
None of this is to say that eighteenth- and nineteenth�century 
Americans simply repeated earlier European formulations of separa­
tion of church . and state. To the contrary, as both Professors 
Hamburger and Dreisbach make clear, American writers adopted and 
adapted the principle of separation of church and state to express a 
variety of new (or newly prominent) ideals. At least five understand­
ings of separationism became commonplace in the opening decades of 
the American republic. 
· 
First, separationism aimed to protect the church from the state. 
This had long been a dominant motif in European Catholic and Prot­
estant writings. The concern was to protect church affairs from state 
intrusion, the clergy · from the magistracy, and ecclesiastical rules and 
rites from political coercion and control. This accent continued and 
grew in American discussions of separationism. George Washington, 
for example, wrote in 1789 of the need "to establish effectual barriers 
against the horrors of spiritual tyranny, and every species of religious 
persecution" so that there was no threat to "the religious rights of any 
ecclesiastical Society."98 This ideal of separationism was captured in 
98. Quoted and discussed in DREISBACH, pp. 84-85. 
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state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of association 
and free exercise rights of religious groups.99 
Second, separationism served to protect the liberty of conscience 
of the religious believer from the intrusions of both church and state. 
This had been an early and enduring aspiration of some Anabaptist 
and Quaker separationist writers in Europe.100 It became common­
place in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. "Every Man has 
an equal Right to follow the Dictates of his own Conscience in the 
Affairs of Religion . . .  and to follow his Judgment wherever it leads 
him," one pamphleteer wrote. This is "an equal Right with any Rulers 
be they Civil or Ecclesiastical. " 10 1 This goal of separationism was cap­
tured in the numerous state constitutional guarantees of liberty of 
conscience.102 
Third, separationism served to protect the state from the church. 
This was a more novel sentiment in early America, but it was pressed 
with increasing alacrity at the turn of the nineteenth century. Tunis 
Wortman, for example, wrote: "Religion and government are equally 
necessary, but their interests should be kept separate and distinct."103 
"Upon no plan, no system, can they become united, without endan­
gering the purity and usefulness of both - the church will corrupt the 
state, and the state pollute the church."104 This goal of separationism 
was particularly pronounced in state constitutional and statutory pro­
hibitions on clerical participation in political office.105 
Fourth, separationism served to protect individual state govern­
ments from interference by the federal government in governing their 
local religious affairs. As Professor Dreisbach argues, this "jurisdic­
tional view" of separationism was part and product of the American 
founders' experiment in federalism (Dreisbach, pp. 55-70). The found-
99. For examples, see JOHN WITIE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 42-44, 88-91, 246-49 
(2000) [hereinafter WITIE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT]. 
100. See, e.g. , WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670), 
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79-119, esp. 10 1 ,  1 12 (Andrew R. 
Murphy ed., 2002). See other examples in Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Per­
spective. in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 50-55 (Noel B. Reynolds & w. 
Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1 996). 
1 01 .  ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS 7-8 
(1744). 
102. See samples in WITIE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT, supra note 99, at 39-42, 88-89, 246-49. 
103. Quoted and discussed in HAMBURGER, p. 122 (internal quotation marks and cita­
tion omitted). 
1 04. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
105. See HAMBURGER, pp. 79-88; Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution 's Forgotten 
Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VJ Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261 
(1996). 
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ers regarded religion as a "subject reserved to the jurisdictions of the 
individual, religious societies, and state governments; the federal gov­
ernment was denied all authority in matters pertaining to religion" 
(Dreisbach, p. 62). The individual's jurisdiction over religion was pro­
tected by the constitutional principle of liberty of conscience. The 
church's jurisdiction was protected by the constitutional principle of 
free exercise and free association. The individual state's jurisdiction 
was protected by the constitutional principle of federalism. On this 
jurisdictional reading of separationism, state governments were free to 
patronize, protect, and participate in religious affairs, so long as they 
did not trespass the religious freedom of religious bodies or individu­
als. But the federal government was entirely foreclosed from the same. 
Fifth, separationism served to protect society from unwelcome par­
ticipation in and support for religion. In the eighteenth century, this 
view of separationism drove the many campaigns against mandatory 
payments of tithes, required participation in swearing oaths, or forced 
attendance at religious services. In the nineteenth century, this view 
of separationism spurred the call to separate religion and politics 
altogether. This was the most novel, and the most controversial, form 
of separationist logic to emerge in early American history. 
Hamburger documents the nineteenth-century unfolding of this 
fifth form of strict separationist logic and rhetoric in stunning detail. 
Attempts to implement this separationism at law caused endless 
rounds of bitter fighting throughout the nineteenth century. The 
fighting began with the infamous battles between Federalists and 
Republicans over the election of Thomas Jefferson (Hamburger, pp. 
111 -43). The fighting continued in the successive state (and sometimes 
federal) battles over freemasonry, Sunday laws, slavery and abolition, 
marriage and divorce reforms, religious education, enforcement of 
Christian morals, and more (Hamburger, pp. 178-79, 244-45, 262-67, 
305-08, 355-57, 391-99, 414-17, 445-46). And the fighting broke out yet 
again in the great, but ultimately futile, battles to amend the United 
States Constitution, either with overtly pro-Christian or covertly 
antireligious sentiments (Hamburger, pp. 287-334). 
B. First Amendment Separationism? 
It is an interesting, but largely passing, question for both these 
authors which of these views of separationism, if any, informed the 
First Amendment religion clauses. That subject has been argued at 
inordinate length by others, and the authors accordingly state their 
views briefly.106 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make 
106. See DREISBACH, pp. 55-7 6; HAMBURGER, pp. 9-13, 89-107 ; see a/so Daniel L. 
Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the American Constitutional Tradi­
tion, 49 EMORY L.J. 223 (2000) (reviewing WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, supra note 99); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional 
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no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof." 107 Both authors agree that this language has nothing 
to do with the fifth form of strict separation of religion and politics. 
Dreisbach argues that the First Amendment was the crowning piece of 
the fourth type of "jurisdictional" separationism. It was a guarantee 
that the federal government ("Congress") could make no law 
respecting religion, for such matters were left to the states, who were 
unaffected by the First Amendment (Dreisbach, pp. 1-4, 58-70). 
Hamburger argues that the First Amendment does not deal with sepa­
rationism at all. For him, the First Amendment was a demand for: 
a religious liberty that limited civil government; especially civil legisla­
tion, rather than for a religious liberty conceived as a separation of 
church and state. Moreover, in attempting to prohibit the civil legislation 
that would establish religion, [it] sought to preserve the power of gov­
ernment to legislate on religion in other ways." (Hamburger, p. 107) 
The cryptic record of the debates over the First Amendment re­
ligibn clauses can support both these readings - and many others. My 
own reading is that the Disestablishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
provided interlocking guarantees that at least touched on the first four 
types of separationism, but not on the fifth. In iny view, the Free Ex� 
ercise Clause was intended to outlaw Congressional proscriptions of 
religion - actions that unduly burdened the conscience, restricted 
religious exercise, discriminated against religion, or invaded the 
autonomy of. churches and other religious bodies. The Disestablish­
ment Clause was intended to outlaw Congressional prescriptions of 
religion - actions that coerced the conscience, mandated forms of 
religious exercise, discriminated in favor of religion, or improperly 
allied the state with churches or other religious bodies. 108 While the 
term "separation of church and state" makes no appearance in the 
First Amendment text, the principle of separationism does, and in 
various forms. 109 
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); 
Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal 
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. Cr. REV. 295. 
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
108. WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, supra 
note 99, at 37-86. 
109. See also id. at 91-96 (arguing similarly that while the term "separation of church 
and state" does not appear in the texts of nineteenth-century state constitutions, the princi­
ple of separation of church and state does). Interestingly, while Hamburger eschews such 
analysis regarding the First Amendment, he interprets several nineteenth-century federal 
and state provisions as separationist in spirit, even if not in letter. See, e.g. , HAMBURGER, pp. 
90-107. 
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C. Thomas Jefferson 's Separationism 
The more interesting question for both these authors is what views 
of separationism were espoused by Thomas Jefferson. More particu­
larly, what views did Thomas Jefferson espouse in his famous 1802 
Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, which the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly used as the authoritative gloss on the First Amendment 
text?1 10 
The Danbury Letter must be understood in political context, and 
both authors take pains to provide the same. 1 1 1  Less than two years 
before, Jefferson had barely survived a brutal Presidential campaign 
against incumbent John Adams. Leaders of Adams's Federalist party 
charged that Jefferson was an immoral, deist, Jacobin infidel, bent on 
severing government from its necessary religious roots and essential 
clerical alliances. Particularly vehement in this attack were the New 
England clergy who presided over the established Congregationalist 
churches. Leaders of Jefferson's Republican party countered that 
Jefferson was a Christian, albeit of an unusual sort, who saw separa­
tion of church and state as essential to the protection of religious lib­
erty. Some went further and urged officious establishment churchmen 
either to give up their political platforms or to give up their political 
perquisites. Clergy should not claim exemptions from government 
burdens yet claim special entitlements to preach about politics. The 
political and theological stakes in this political battle were very high. 
Jefferson, already no warm friend of clergy, came away with a bitter 
hatred for the established clergy of New England - those "barbari­
ans" and "bigots in religion and government," as he complained 
privately.m 
One year into his Presidency, Thomas Jefferson received a 
congratulatory letter from a small company of Baptists in Danbury, 
Connecticut. Chafing under the restrictions and taxes imposed by the 
Congregationalist establishment of Connecticut, this obscure company 
of Baptists also requested Jefferson's counsel on how better to secure 
religious liberty in the state. Jefferson saw this letter as a welcome 
occasion to sow "useful truths and principles" among friends and foes 
alike about his views of religious liberty (Dreisbach, p. 43). He aimed 
in particular, as he put it, to condemn "the alliance of church and 
state, under the authority of the Constitution" and to explain why he 
as President did not offer Thanksgiving Day proclamations and 
1 10. For Supreme Court cases that cite the letter, see DREISBACH, pp. 97-106, and 
HAMBURGER, pp. 6-7, 454-78. 
1 1 1. See DREISBACH, pp. 25-54; HAMBURGER, pp. 1 11-55. 
1 12. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 93 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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prayers, even though he had done so as Governor of Virginia. 1 13 The 
first draft of the letter sought to accomplish both goals. His Attorney 
General, Levi Lincoln, advised Jefferson to drop the discussion of 
Thanksgiving proclamations, for fear of offending Republican friends 
and Federalist foes alike. 1 1 4  Jefferson obliged him, and issued the final 
letter on January 1, 1802. After its opening salutation the full letter 
reads: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his 
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & 
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the 
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church 
& State. [A]dhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation 
in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction 
the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his 
natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his so­
cial duties. 
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the 
common father and creator of man, and tender you for yourselves & 
your religious association, assurances of my high respect & esteem.1 1 5 
Professor Dreisbach reads this letter as a part and product of 
Jefferson's jurisdictional separationism. Jefferson said many times that 
no branch of the federal government, including the executive branch, 
had jurisdiction over religion. Religion was entirely a state and local 
matter. As he put it famously in his Second Inaugural: 
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by 
the constitution independent of the powers of the general [federal] gov­
ernment. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the 
religious exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution 
found them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church 
authorities. 1 1 6 
Governor Jefferson's ample earlier religious activities thus provided 
little guidance or precedent for what he could do as President. As 
President he had to be more circumspect in matters religious. In his 
return letter, therefore, President Jefferson did not counsel the 
1 13 .  DREISBACH, pp. 43-44. Governor Jefferson's 1779 Thanksgiving proclamation is in 
DREISBACH, pp. 137-39. 
114. Levi's letter is quoted in DREISBACH, pp. 44-45. The changes that Jefferson made 
are tabulated in DREISBACH, pp. 48-49. 
1 15. DREISBACH, p. 1 48. This edition corrects the punctuation of the common edition in 
8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1 13-14 (H. Washington ed., 1853-54), and prop­
erly uses the original word "legitimate" rather than "legislative." 
1 16. DREISBACH, p. 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Danbury Baptists on how to undo the Connecticut establishments, nor 
did he condemn the establishment clergy themselves. Jefferson's was a 
more subtle and suitable presidential approach of sowing "useful 
truths and principles" about the meaning of religious liberty in the 
young nation (Dreisbach, p. 53). 
After a meticulous sifting of the various drafts of the Danbury 
Letter, Dreisbach concludes: 
A universal principle of church-state separation applicable at all levels of 
civil government - local, state, and federal - was not among the seeds 
deliberately sown. Jefferson explicitly .stated that his project was to ad­
dress church-state relations "under the authority of the Constitution," 
and he clearly recognized that the First Amendment, with its metaphoric 
barrier, was applicable to the federal government only . . . .  [T]he "wall of 
separation" metaphor reconceptualized the First Amendment in terms of 
separation between church and (federal) state. (Dreisbach, pp. 53-54) 
The final letter said nothing directly about the free exercise or 
nonestablishment of religion. But Jefferson's view of the nonestab­
lishment prohibition on religious establishments by the federal gov­
ernment "was much more expansive than virtually all previous inter­
pretations,'' for he had intended to go so far as to outlaw presidential 
Thanksgiving Day proclamations (Dreisbach, p. 54). 
Professor Hamburger reads Jefferson's . letter as evidence of Jeffer­
son's abiding anticlericalism - his desire to separate clergy, and 
indeed religion altogether, from the state and the political process. 
Jefferson hated the clergy, Hamburger argues, and the bitter 1800 
campaign only deepened his resolve to separate them from matters 
political. Owing to their religious privileges, the clergy were both 
politically and psychologically powerful. They held a "tyranny over 
the mind of man,'' dulling them into "steady habits,'' stable institu­
tions, and routine rituals that impeded experimentation and novelty, 
the lifeblood of liberty and progress (Hamburger, pp. 148-49). 
It would be better for the clergy to stick to their specialty of soul­
craft, rather than interfere in the specialty of statecraft. Religion is 
merely "a separate department of knowledge,'' Jefferson wrote, along­
side other specialized disciplines like physics, biology, law, politics, 
and medicine. Preachers are the specialists in religion, and are hired 
by churches to devote their time and energy to this specialty. As 
Jefferson put it: 
Whenever, therefore, preachers, instead of a lesson in religion, put them 
off with a discourse on the Copernican system, on chemical affinities, on 
the construction of government, or the characters or conduct of those 
administering it, it is a breach of contract, depriving their audience of the 
kind of service for which they are salaried.117 
117.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.H. Wendover (March 13, 1815), quoted and dis­
cussed in HAMBURGER, pp. 152-55. 
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This is a marvelous insight into one aspect of Jefferson's theory of 
religious liberty. It goes beyond the typical argument that Jefferson's 
theory of society sought to privatize religion, leaving the public square 
open to the discourse of reason. What Hamburger shows is that Jeffer­
son's theory of knowledge also sought to compartmentalize religion, 
leaving the department of politics and law free from clerical influence 
or interference. This is not only an intriguing new epistemology of 
separation. It is also an anticipation of the positivist philosophy of 
knowledge made famous two decades later by French philosopher 
Auguste Comte that sought to differentiate all of human knowledge 
into a series of separate disciplines and specialties. 1 1 8  
While Hamburger's account of Jefferson's anticlericalism is  com­
pelling, I find less compelling his argument that this was the import of 
Jefferson's 1802 Danbury Letter. First, this religious specialization 
thesis is the subject of an unsent letter of 1815, prepared more than a 
decade after the Danbury Letter. Second, there is not a word of anti­
clericalism in the Danbury Letter. Hamburger says that Jefferson's 
phrase "with sovereign reverence" was intended irony aimed to tweak 
the New England establishment clergy (Hamburger, p. 147). But why 
should it be ironic or strategic? Jefferson did revere the divine, albeit 
unconventionally. Moreover, in the letter's concluding paragraph, 
which Hamburger does not quote, Jefferson did show "sovereign 
reverence" and invoked God's name in reciprocating the Danbury 
Baptists' prayers. 
Both these readings of Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists 
are novel and provocative. Despite their differences, they both show 
how multiple views of separation of church and state can be plausibly 
read in this famous text. I read another view of separationism in the 
text, namely, Jefferson's explicit concern to separate church and state 
for the protection of individual conscience. Liberty of conscience had 
long been one of Jefferson's central preoccupations. He had stated his 
view with particular flourish in his 1786 Act for the Establishment of 
Religious Freedom.1 19 This preoccupation with liberty of conscience 
continues in his 1802 Letter, as much of the long first sentence makes 
clear: "religion is a matter which lies solely between a Man & His god, 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that 
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opin­
ions . . . .  " Then after reciting his memorable "thus building a wall of 
separation between Church & State," he says that "this expression of 
the supreme will of the nation [was] in behalf of the rights of 
1 18. See THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE (Harriet Martineau ed., 
1853). 
1 1 9. 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE . . .  OF VIRGINIA 84-86. The 1779 Draft Bill is in­
cluded in DREISBACH, pp. 133-35. 
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conscience," and designed "to restore to man all his natural rights, 
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." 120 
Separationism thus assured individuals of their natural, inalienable 
right of conscience, which could be exercised freely and fully to the 
point of breaching the peace or shirking social duties. Jefferson is not 
talking here of separating politics and religion altogether, nor is he 
eschewing federal religious activity altogether. Indeed, in the last 
paragraph of his letter, President Jefferson performed an avowedly 
religious act of offering prayers on behalf of his Baptist correspon­
dents: "I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing 
of the common father and creator of man."121 
D. ·Separationism and Anti-Catholicism 
The bitter political struggles of 1800 were only the opening shots in 
a century-long American battle over the meaning and means of sepa­
rating church and state. It was a battle fought in Congress and in the 
courts, in states and on the frontier, in churches and in the schools, in 
clubs and at the ballot box. It was largely a war of words, occasionally 
a war of arms. The battles included many familiar foes - Republicans 
and Federalists, the Nortq _and the South, N�tive Americans and new 
immigrants, the cit_ies and the countryside. It als.o included a host of 
newly established political groups: the American Protestant Associa­
tion, the Know-Nothing Party, the Ku Klux Klan, the American 
Protective Association, the National Liberal Le;igue, the · American 
Secular Union, the National Reform Association, the Masonic 
League, and many more. All these antagonists make appearances on 
Hamburger's wide stage, tell their separationist stories in long-quoted 
pamphlets, briefs, and speeches, before yielding the stage to others. 
This is an extraordinary dra�a that Hamburger tells with flourish and 
power. 
I would like to focus on just one running episode in this great 
battle, the repeated clashes between Protestants and Catholics over 
separationism. The long and sad story of the anti�Catholicism 
of American Protestants is well known. Around 1790, American 
Protestants and Catholics had seemed ready to put their bitter and 
bloody battles behind them. But with the swelling tide of Catholic 
emigres into America after the 1820s - all demanding work, building 
schools, establishing charities, converting souls, and gaining influence 
- native-born Protestants and patriots began to protest. Catholic 
bashing became a favorite sport of preachers and pamphleteers. Then 
rioting and church burnings broke out in the 1830s and 1840s, followed 
120. Quoted in DREISBACH, p. 148 (emphasis added). 
121. See id. 
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by even more vicious verbal pillorying and repressive actions against 
Catholics that continued well into the twentieth century. This sad and 
ugly story is well known, and Hamburger recounts it faithfully 
(Hamburger, pp. 191-251,  272-302). 
What Hamburger makes clear is that the principle of separation 
of church and state became one of the strong new weapons in the 
anti-Catholic arsenal. Foreign Catholics were for the union of church 
and state, the propagandists claimed. American Protestants were for 
the separation of church and state. To be a Catholic was to oppose 
separationism and American-style liberties. To be a Protestant was to 
defend separationism and American-style liberties. To bash a Catholic 
was thus not a manifestation of religious bigotry, but a demonstration 
of American patriotism. Protestants and patriots began to run closely 
together, often tripping over each other to defend separationism and 
to decry and deny Catholics for their failure to do so (Hamburger, pp. 
201-240). 
Hamburger properly indicts scores of Protestant leaders and fol­
lowers for their participation or complicity in the violence and political 
scheming against Catholics on the pretext or platform of separation of 
church and state. He properly points to the battles over school and 
school funding as the arena where the fighting was fiercest (Ham­
burger, pp. 219-29, 322, 340-41, 412-18). All this is a salutary corrective 
to more pro-Protestant traditional accounts.122 
But it is important that the corrected story not now be read as a 
simple dialectic of Protestant separationist hawks versus Catholic 
unionist doves. And it is important to be clear that the Protestant­
Catholic battle over the doctrine of separation of church and state had 
two sides, with Catholics giving as well as taking, winning as well as 
losing. Professor Hamburger takes pains to show that not all Protes­
tants and Catholics participated in these rivalries and that not all these 
rivalries turned on separation of church and state (Hamburger, pp. 
219-46). These caveats deserve amplification. 
First, many American Catholic clergy were themselves separation­
ists, building their views in part on the ancient patristic models of two 
communities, two cities, and two powers. 123 Moreover, a good number 
of American Catholic clergy saw separation of church and state as an 
essential principle of religious liberty and embraced the doctrine with­
out evident cavil or concern. Alexis de Tocqueville, for one, noted this 
in his Democracy in America (1835): 
In France I had seen the spirits of religion and of freedom almost always 
marching in opposite directions. In America I found them intimately 
122. Including my own unduly pro-Protestant reading. See criticisms in Richard W. 
Garnett, Francis Bacon Takes on the Ghouls: The "First Principles" of Religious Freedom, 3 
GREEN BAG (2d ser.) 447, 453-54 (2000). 
123. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
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linked together in joint reign over the same land. My longing to under­
stand the reason for this phenomenon increased daily. To find this out, I 
questioned the faithful of all communions; I particularly sought the soci­
ety of clergymen, who are the depositaries of the various creeds and have 
a personal interest in their survival. As a practicing Catholic I was par­
ticularly close to the Catholic priests, with some of whom I soon estab­
lished a certain intimacy. I expressed my astonishment and revealed my 
doubts to each of them; I found that they all agreed with each other ex­
cept about details; all thought that the main reason for the quiet sway of 
religion over their country was the compete separation of church and 
state. I have no hesitation in stating that throughout my stay in America I 
met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that.124 
Second, many Protestant anti-Catholic writings started not so 
much as attacks upon American Catholics as counterattacks to several 
blistering papal condemnations of Protestantism, democracy, religious 
liberty, and separation of church and state. In Mirari vos (1832) , for 
example, Pope Gregory XVI condemned in no uncertain terms all 
churches that deviated from the Church of Rome, and all states that 
granted liberty of conscience, free exercise, and free speech to their 
citizens.1 25 For the pope it was an "absurd and erroneous proposition 
which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for every­
one. "126 The pope "denounced freedom to publish any writings what­
ever and disseminate them to the people . . . .  The Church has always 
taken action to destroy the plague of bad books."127 He declared 
anathema against the "detestable insolence and probity" of Luther 
and other Protestant "sons of Belial," those "sores and disgraces 
of the human race" who "joyfully deem themselves 'free of all.' "128 
Even worse, the Pope averred, were "the plans of those who desire 
vehemently to separate the Church from the state, and to break the 
mutual concord between temporal authority and the priesthood." 129 
The reality, the Pope insisted, was that state officials "received their 
authority not only for the government of the world, but especially for 
the defense of the Church. "130 
In the blistering Syllabus of Errors (1864), the papacy condemned 
as cardinal errors the propositions that: 
124. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (George Lawrence 
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (paragraph breaks removed). 
125. See HAMBURGER, pp. 229-34 (discussing some of this papal document and Protes­
tant reactions thereto). 
126. Mirari vos (On Liberalism and Religious lndifferentism) (1832) [hereinafter Mirari 
vos], available at http://www.petersnet.net/browse/3881.htm, 'II 14 (last visited Sept. 15, 2003). 
127. Id. 'II'II 15-16. 
1 28. Id. 'II 19. "Belia!" means the "spirit of evil personified" or "fallen angel." OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY "Belia!" (1971). 
129. Mirari vos, supra note 126, 'II 20. 
130. Id. 'II 23. 
1900 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 : 1869 
18. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true 
Christian religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as 
in the Catholic Church. 
1 9. The Church is not a true, and perfect, and entirely free society, nor 
does she enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her 
Divine Founder, but it appertains to the civil power to define what are 
the rights and limits with which the Church may exercise authority . . . .  
24. The church has not the power of availing herself of force, or any di­
rect or indirect temporal power . . . .  
55. The Church ought to be separate from the State, and the State from 
the Church. 131 
In place of these cardinal errors, the. papacy declared that the Catholic 
Church was the only true church, which must, as in medieval centuries 
past, enjoy power in both spiritual and temporal affairs, unhindered by 
the state.132 Six years later, the church declared the pope's teachings to 
be infallible and condemned Protestants as "heretics" who dared sub­
ordinate the "divine magisterium of the Church" to the "judgment of 
each individual. " 133 
It is perhaps no surprise that American Protestants repaid such 
alarming comments in kind - and then with interest. The pope, 
as Americans heard him, had condemned the very existence of 
Protestantism and the very fundamentals of American democracy and 
liberty - effectively calling the swelling population of American 
Catholics to arms. Many Protestants saw in the papacy's favorable 
references to its past medieval powers134 specters of the two-swords 
theory by which the papacy had claimed supreme rule in a unified 
Christendom. 135 This simply could not be for Protestants. Conveniently 
armed with new editions of the writings of Martin Luther,136 John 
Calvin,137 and others,138 American Protestants repeated much of the 
vitriolic anti-Catholic and anticlerical rhetoric that had clattered so 
131 .  The Papal Syllabus of Errors (1864), in 2 CREEDS, supra note 95, at 213, 217-19, 
227. 
132. Id. at 2 18-33, H 20, 24-35, 4 1 -44, 53-54, 75-80. 
1 33. The Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council Concerning the Catholic Faith and 
the Church of Christ (1870), reprinted in 2 CREEDS, supra note 95, at 234, 236. 
1 34. Id. at 221 , 'II 34. 
135. See supra notes 67-74. 
1 36. See ERIC W. GRITSCH, A HISTORY OF LUTHERANISM 179-216 (2002); ERIC W. 
GRITSCH & ROBERT W. JENSON, LUTHERANISM: THE THEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT AND ITS 
CONFESSIONAL WRITINGS ( 1 976). 
1 37. See WULFERT DE GREEF, THE WRITINGS OF JOHN CALVIN (Lyle D. Bierma trans., 
Baker Book House Co. 1993) (1989). 
1 38. See JOHN ADAMS, A D ISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1774), 
reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 447 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (denouncing 
Catholic canon law and papal authority for its intrusions on liberty). 
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loudly throughout the sixteenth century. At least initially, the loud 
commendation of America's separation of church and state and loud 
condemnation of the Catholic union of church and state was more a 
rhetorical quid pro quo to the papacy than a political low blow to 
American Catholics. Inevitably, there was plenty of political imitation 
and plenty of cheap shots taken at the American Catholic clergy, par­
ticularly those who echoed the papacy. And inevitably, this rhetoric 
brought anti-Catholicism and pro-separationism into close association 
- particularly when it was taken up by secular political groups, few of 
whom spoke for most mainstream Protestants. 
Third, when local anti-Catholic measures did pass, as they too of­
ten did, both the United States Supreme Court and Congress some­
times provided Catholics with relief. Thus in Cummings v. Missouri 
(1866), the Court held that a state may not deprive a Catholic priest of 
the right to preach for failure to take a mandatory oath disavowing his 
support for the confederate states.139 In Watson v. Jones (1871) and 
Bouldin v. Alexander (1872), the Court required civil courts to defer to 
the judgment of the highest religious authorities in resolving intra­
church disputes, explicitly extending that principle to Catholics.140 In 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892), the Court refused 
to uphold a new federal law forbidding contracts with foreign clergy, a 
vital issue for Catholic clergy.141 In Bradfield v. Roberts (1899) , the 
Court upheld, against Establishment Clause challenge, a federal grant 
to build a Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia.142 In Quick 
Bear v. Leupp (1908), the Court upheld the federal distribution 
of funds to Catholic schools that offered education to Native 
Americans.143 In Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser (1914), the Court 
upheld a monastery's communal ownership of property against claims 
by relatives of a deceased monk. 144 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
(1925), the Court invalidated a state law making public school atten­
dance mandatory, thereby protecting the rights of Catholic parents 
and schools to educate children in a religious school environment.145 A 
good number of these Supreme Court holdings were, in part, expres­
sions of the principle of separation of church and state. And there 
were more such Catholic victories in state courts, in cases that also 
sometimes sounded in separationist terms.146 
139. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
140. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
141. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
142. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
143. 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
144. 234 U.S. 640 (1914). 
145. 268 U.S. 5 10 (1925); see also HAMBURGER, pp. 417-19, 453. 
146. CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW (1933). 
1902 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1869 
Fourth, it is going too far, in my view, to allege that later Protes­
tants rewrote history to claim they had invented separationism earlier 
and had inscribed it onto American constitutional law (Hamburger, 
pp. 201-19, 246-51 ,  342-59). This charge presupposes that Protestants 
did not teach separation of church and state before the mid-nineteenth 
century. But they did.147 This charge presupposes that earlier 
American constitutional laws did not prescribe separationism. But 
they did.148 And this charge presupposes that those who wrote about 
the history of Protestant separationism were both falsifying the record 
and fortifying their anti-Catholicism. Not only would this be a big 
surprise to many Protestant historians who wrote on the history of 
church-state relations, but it also does not explain why a host of nine­
teenth-century European writers, both Catholic and Protestant -
Alexis de Tocqueville, Lord Acton, Philip Schaff, Abraham Kuyper, 
and many others - with no anti-Catholic ax to grind and no fraudu­
lent historiography to press would write so favorably about the long 
history of Protestant separationism.149 
Finally, all these great campaigns for a strict separation of church 
and state, whether or not anti-Catholic in motivation, made rather few 
legal changes in nineteenth-century America. The dominant reality 
was that liberty of conscience was guaranteed against church and state. 
Churches and states retained separate offices and operations yet 
cooperated and supported each other in countless ways. The federal 
government remained largely removed from religious affairs, leaving 
states and local governments to govern questions of religion and 
religious liberty. A "mass of organic utterances," as the Supreme 
Court put in 1892,150 testify to this reality, which Professor Dreisbach 
has detailed in several writings beyond the volume under review.15 1 
This was no paradigm or paradise of American religious liberty. But it 
147. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra .notes 98-109 and accompanying text. 
149. See ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (1931) (lectures delivered at 
Princeton University, 1898) ; ABRAHAM KUYPER. VARIA AMERICANA (1899); PHILIP 
SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1888); TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 
124; ACTON IN AMERICA: THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SIR JOHN ACTON 1853 (S.W. 
Jackman ed., 1979). For other such foreign impressions see sources in HENRY T. 
TUCKERMAN, AMERICA AND HER COMMENTATORS (1864); AMERICA THROUGH BRITISH 
EYES (Allan Nevins ed., 1948); and AMERIKA IN EUROPESE OGEN (K. van Berkel ed., 
1990). 
150. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
151. See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Exami­
nation of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian 
Religion in the United States Constitlllion, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927 (1996). See also the re­
cent MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (2002) and the massive literature distilled therein. 
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does attest to the legal presence of the first four kinds of separation of 
church and state, but not the fifth form of strict separationism.152 
V. DEUTERONOMY: WHAT LEGAL PLACE FOR SEPARATIONISM 
TODAY? 
All this changed dramatically with Everson v. Board of Education 
(1947), where Justice Black made strict separationism a mandate of 
the First Amendment Establishment Clause.153 As Justice Black put it 
for the Everson majority: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per­
son to go or to remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church at­
tendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice re­
ligion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or se­
cretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, 
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between 
church and State. "154 
Readers of Hamburger's volume will recognize that not a single 
statement in Justice Black's lengthy recitation was new. Groups like 
the National Liberal League and . the Ku Klux .Klan (of which Justice 
Black had been a member), had pressed for all these separationist 
precepts, and indeed many more, for decades (Hamburger, pp. 399-
454). What was new was the elevation of these separationist precepts 
from a popular demand to a constitutional command that was binding 
on both federal and state governments. Readers of Dreisbach's vol­
ume will recognize that this latter move in the name of separation of 
church and state was in defiance of another species of separation, the 
separation of federal and state governance of religion and religious 
liberty. While there may have been good reasons for the Court to 
apply the First Amendment to the states, this move defied a basic 
structural separation of jurisdictions that the founders, for good or ill, 
thought essential to the protection of American religious liberty.155 
152. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
153. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
154. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
155. DREISBACH, pp. 97-1 16; Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of His­
tory: The Supreme Court, Lessons of History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in 
1904 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1869 
Much of the rest of the American separationist story has risen to 
hornbook familiarity,156 and both authors eschew detailed analysis of 
it. It is now well known that, from 1947-1989, the Supreme Court 
applied its newly minted separationist logic primarily to issues of edu­
cation. In nearly forty cases, the Court largely removed religion from 
the public school and largely removed religious schools from state 
patronage. 157 In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court demanded that 
all laws must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) foster no excessive en­
tanglement between church and state.158 This constitutional reification 
of separationist logic rendered the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause a formidable weapon for lower courts to outlaw many remain­
ing forms and forums of church-state cooperation. 
It is also well known that the Supreme Court of late has aban­
doned much of this strict separationism in favor of other principles of 
religious liberty - neutrality, accommodationism, noncoercion, equal 
treatment, and nonendorsement most prominently. 159 Many of these 
new Establishment Clause principles have been more deferential to 
state laws on religion and thus at least tacitly more sympathetic to the 
jurisdictional separationism that Professor Dreisbach has described. 
In my view, separation of church and state must remain a vital 
principle of American religious liberty - despite its serpentine history 
and despite the antireligious words, deeds, and associations that it has 
sometimes inspired. Separationism needs to be retained, particularly 
for its ancient insight of protecting religious bodies from the state and 
for its more recent insight of protecting religious believers from viola­
tions by government or religious bodies. Separationism, however, also 
needs to be contained, and not used as an antireligious weapon in the 
culture wars of the public square, public school, or public court. 
Separation of church and state must be viewed as a shield not a sword 
in the great struggle to achieve religious liberty for all. 
Separation of church and state serves religious liberty best when it 
is used prudentially not categorically. James Madison, a firm propo­
nent of separationism in later life, warned in 1833 that "it may not be 
easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the 
EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23 (Jo 
Renee Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997). 
156. See a good summary in THOMAS c. BERG, RELIGION AND THE STATE IN A 
NUTSHELL (1998). 
157. See MICHAEL w. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002); 
ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: 
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 1996). 
1 58. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
1 59. See WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, su­
pra note 99, at 154-63; cases cited supra notes 26-27. 
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rights of Religion & the Civil authority, with such distinctness, as to 
avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points."160 This caveat has 
become even more salient today. For better or worse, the modem 
American welfare state, and now the modem American security state, 
reaches very deeply into virtually all aspects of modem life through its 
vast network of education, charity, welfare, child care, health care, 
construction, zoning, workplace, taxation, immigration, security, and 
sundry other regulations. Madison's preferred solution was "an entire 
abstinence of the Government from interference [with religion] in any 
way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & 
protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others."161 
This traditional understanding of a minimal state role in the life of so­
ciety in general, and of religious bodies in particular - however 
alluring it may be in libertarian theory - is no longer realistic in 
practice. 
It is thus even more imperative today than in Madison's day that 
the principle of separation of church and state not be pressed to reach 
what Madison called the "unessentials. "  It is one thing to outlaw daily 
Christian prayers and broadcasted Bible readings from the public 
school, quite another thing to ban moments of silence and private 
displays of the Decalogue in the same schools. It is one thing to bar 
direct tax support for religious education, quite another thing to bar 
tax deductions for parents who wish to educate their children in the 
faith. It is one thing to prevent government officials from delegating 
their core police powers to religious bodies, quite another thing to 
prevent them from facilitating the charitable services of voluntary 
religious and nonreligious associations alike. It is one thing to outlaw 
governmental prescriptions of prayers, ceremonies, and symbols in 
public forums, quite another thing to outlaw governmental accommo­
dations of private prayers, ceremonies, and symbols in public forums. 
To press separationist logic too deeply into the "unessentials" not only 
"trivializes" religion in public and private life, as Stephen Carter has 
argued.1 62 It also trivializes the Constitution, converting it from a coda 
of cardinal principles of national law into a codex of petty precepts of 
local life. 
160. Letter from James Madison to Reverend Jasper Adams, reprinted in DREISBACH, 
pp. 83 (emphasis added). 
161 .  DREISBACH, supra note 37, at 1 17, 120. 
162. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
